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[Abstract and Thanks] 
During the long eighteenth century the capital code, and more specifically the so-called 
‘Bloody Code’ which subjected a vast and increasing range of property crimes to the death 
penalty, was the centre of much popular attention and of extensive debate. The impact of the 
Bloody Code has also attracted much attention from historians, some of whom have argued 
that it played a vital role both within the criminal law and in eighteenth-century social 
relations more generally. However, the geography of the Bloody Code and the possibility that 
there were major regional differences both in the use of hanging, and in attitudes to it, has 
been largely ignored by historians. By systematically exploring the spatial dimensions of 
capital punishment in eighteenth-century Britain, this article demonstrates the refusal of many 
areas on the periphery to implement the Bloody Code. The reluctance in the far western and 
northern periphery of Britain to execute property offenders, it is argued, requires us to rethink 
some of our core assumptions about the key role historians have given to the Bloody Code in 
maintaining the hegemony of the elite, about the process by which the capital code came to 
be reformed, and about the reach of the state in the long eighteenth century. 
 
* We are very grateful to the Wellcome Trust for their extremely generous support of the 
Harnessing the Power of the Criminal Corpse project (grant number 095904/Z/11/Z), out of 
which this article was researched and written. We would also like to thank our colleagues on 
the project for their helpful comments on previous drafts of the work – namely, Rachel 
Bennett, Owen Davies, Zoe Dyndor, Elizabeth Hurren, Francesca Matteoni, Shane 
McCorristine, Sarah Tarlow and Floris Tomasini.  
 
1 
Rethinking the Bloody Code in Eighteenth-Century Britain: Capital Punishment at the Centre 
and on the Periphery 
 
Peter King and Richard Ward 
 
During the long eighteenth century the capital code, and more specifically the so-called 
‘Bloody Code’ which subjected a vast and increasing range of property crimes to the death 
penalty, was the centre of much popular attention and of extensive debate.1 Hangings 
attracted huge, ambivalent and often unruly crowds.2 Newspapers reported hangings and 
capital trials in detail, and a growing volume of contemporary pamphlets and parliamentary 
                                                          
* We are very grateful to the Wellcome Trust for their extremely generous support of the 
Harnessing the Power of the Criminal Corpse project (grant number 095904/Z/11/Z), out of 
which this article was researched and written. We would also like to thank our colleagues on 
the project for their helpful comments on previous drafts of the work — namely, Rachel 
Bennett, Owen Davies, Zoe Dyndor, Elizabeth Hurren, Francesca Matteoni, Shane 
McCorristine, Sarah Tarlow and Floris Tomasini — as well as the anonymous reviewers of 
this journal.   
1 Not all of the rapidly expanding sheaf of capital statutes passed by parliament in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries involved property offences, but the vast majority were 
designed to protect property, and to prevent its appropriation — see Peter Linebaugh, The 
London Hanged: Crime and Civil Society in the Eighteenth Century (London, 1991), 54.  
2 V. A. C. Gatrell, The Hanging Tree: Execution and the English People 1770–1868 (Oxford, 
1994), 56–7. Thomas Lacquer, ‘Crowds, Carnival and the State in English Executions, 1604–
1868’, in A. L. Beier, David Cannadine and James Rosenheim (eds.), The First Modern 
Society: Essays in English History in Honour of Lawrence Stone (Cambridge, 1989). 
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debates centred on the need to reform the capital statutes.3 The impact of the Bloody Code 
has also attracted much attention from historians, some of whom have argued that it played a 
vital role both within the criminal law and in eighteenth-century social relations more 
generally. V. A. C. Gatrell, for example, has suggested that ‘the sanction of the gallows and 
the rhetoric of the death sentence were central to all relations of authority in Georgian 
England.’4 However, the geography of Bloody Code and the possibility that there were major 
regional differences both in the use of hanging, and in attitudes to it, has been largely ignored 
by historians. By systematically exploring the spatial dimensions of capital punishment in 
eighteenth-century Britain, this article will highlight an important aspect of criminal justice 
history — the widespread reluctance of many areas on the periphery to implement the Bloody 
Code — which both contemporary advocates of reform and later historians almost completely 
ignored.  
                                                          
3 Peter King, ‘Making Crime News: Newspapers, Violent Crime and the Selective Reporting 
of Old Bailey Trials in the Late Eighteenth Century’, Crime, Histoire et Societes/Crime, 
History and Societies, xiii (2009), 110–11; Randall McGowen, ‘The Problem of Punishment 
in Eighteenth-Century England’, in Simon Devereaux and Paul Griffiths (eds.), Penal 
Practice and Culture 1500-1900: Punishing the English (Basingstoke, 2004); Randall 
McGowen, ‘The Body and Punishment in Eighteenth-Century England’, Journal of Modern 
History, lix (1987); Randall McGowen, ‘A Powerful Sympathy: Terror, the Prison, and 
Humanitarian Reform in Early Nineteenth-Century Britain’, Journal of British Studies, xxv 
(1986); Leon Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 
1750, 5 vols. (London, 1948–86), i, pp. 231–566. 
4 Gatrell, The Hanging Tree, 32. 
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 Historians working on criminal justice in particular regions have occasionally made 
reference to the possibility that the geography of execution was uneven. Gwenda Morgan and 
Peter Rushton, for example,  noted briefly that the North-East had ‘long periods without a 
hanging,’ while the limited writing available on Scotland has just started to explore whether 
Scottish justice was less ‘exacting’ than the English Bloody Code.5 John Minkes’s work on 
the Brecon Circuit in the 1750s and D. J. V. Jones’s brief article on ‘Life and Death in 
Eighteenth-Century Wales’ have tentatively suggested that Welsh capital convicts received 
‘more favourable punishment’, but this work has been largely ignored by those working on 
capital punishment in eighteenth-century England.6 While J. S. Cockburn and others have 
shown an awareness that ‘executions were disproportionately concentrated in London’, very 
few historians have gone beyond a simple and largely unexplored dichotomy between the 
                                                          
5 Gwenda Morgan and Peter Rushton, Rogues, Thieves and the Rule of Law: The Problem of 
Law Enforcement in North-East England 1718–1800 (London, 1998), 141; Jim Smyth and 
Alan McKinlay, ‘Whigs, Tories and Scottish Legal Reform c.1785–1832’, Crime, Histoire et 
Societes/Crime, History and Societies, xv (2011), 111–32; M. Anne Crowther, ‘Crime, 
Prosecution and Mercy: English Influence and Scottish Practice in the Early Nineteenth 
Century’, in S. J. Connolly (ed.), Kingdoms United? Great Britain and Ireland Since 1500: 
Integration and Diversity (Dublin, 1999), 21: Anne-Marie Kilday, ‘Contemplating the Evil 
Within: Examining Attitudes to Criminality in Scotland, 1700–1840’, in David Lemmings 
(ed.), Crime, Courtrooms and the Public Sphere in Britain 1700–1850 (Farnham, 2012), 152. 
6 D. J. V. Jones, ‘Life and Death in Eighteenth-Century Wales’, Welsh Historical Review, x, 
(1980–1), 539; John Minkes, ‘Wales and the “Bloody Code”: The Brecon Circuit of the Court 
of Great Sessions in the 1750s’, Welsh Historical Review, xxii, (2006), 673–704; D. J. V. 
Jones, Crime in Nineteenth-Century Wales (Cardiff, 1992). 
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metropolis and the provinces.7 Although Gatrell mentioned that there were parts of the 
country where hangings were rare, he did not analyse hanging rates in different areas and, 
following Leon Radzinowicz’s earlier analysis of the execution data found in the 1819 Report 
on the Criminal Laws, the only eighteenth-century statistics Gatrell quoted related to the 
South-East of England.8 Detailed studies of Surrey, Essex and Staffordshire have since been 
published, and Douglas Hay has recently produced some nationwide graphs of post-1760 
pardoning rates, but we still have no county or regional-level analyses of execution rates per 
head of population, which are the key to making effective geographical comparisons about 
the impact of the Bloody Code.9 Using a hitherto largely neglected set of sources, this article 
                                                          
7 J. S. Cockburn, ‘Punishment and Brutalization in the English Enlightenment’, Law and 
History Review, xii, (1994), 159. 
8 Gatrell, The Hanging Tree, 58, 202, 421, 616; Radzinowicz, A History, i, pp. 139–64; 
Douglas Hay, ‘Property, Authority and the Criminal Law’, in Douglas Hay et al. (eds.), 
Albion’s Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (London, 1975), 23, 
also uses these two areas only. The 1819 Report does contain some eighteenth-century data 
on circuits outside the South-East including Durham from 1755, the Western Circuit from 
1770, and the Brecon circuit from 1753. However, it does not include any information on 
Scotland or many other areas such as the Northern Circuit for the eighteenth century. See 
Parliamentary Papers (hereafter Parl. Papers), ‘Report from the Select Committee on the 
Criminal Laws’, viii (585), (1819). 
9 Peter King, Crime, Justice and Discretion in England 1740–1820 (Oxford, 2000); J. M. 
Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England 1660–1800 (Oxford, 1986); Douglas Hay, 
‘Hanging and the English Judges: The Judicial Politics of Retention and Abolition’, in David 
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will show that execution rates varied systematically across Britain and that the Bloody Code 
was widely used at the centre of the British state but often ignored on the periphery — in the 
far West, the North, and the North-West of England, as well in almost all of Scotland  and 
Wales. 
 It will then conclude by briefly exploring a number of broader issues that this research 
raises — about the key role historians have given to the Bloody Code in maintaining the 
hegemony of the eighteenth-century elite, about the process by which the capital code came 
to be reformed, and about the nature of social policy implementation in the eighteenth-
century British state. As Joanna Innes has pointed out, English historians have rarely set 
studies of crime or poverty within a wider British frame. By exploring the uneven 
implementation of the capital code in England, Wales and Scotland, this article aims to 
remedy this for at least one important aspect of the criminal justice system. More importantly 
it will explore the extent to which James C. Scott’s broader theories about the relative 
autonomy experienced by regions on the periphery are applicable to eighteenth-century 
Britain.10 Although Scott’s important book, The Art of Not Being Governed, is based on 
south-east Asia, some of his key concepts have much relevance here. His ideas about the 
difficulties the state experienced in governing the inhabitants of relatively distant and 
inaccessible regions (and particularly areas characterised by their upland/mountainous terrain, 
pastoral agriculture, low population density and inadequate transport links) are clearly 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Garland, Randall McGowen and Michael Meranze (eds.), America’s Death Penalty: Between 
Past and Present (New York, 2011), 134–5. 
10 Joanna Innes, ‘What would a “Four Nations” Approach to the Study of Eighteenth-Century 
British Social Policy Entail?’, in Connolly (ed.), Kingdoms United?, 183; James C. Scott, The 
Art of Not Being Governed (New Haven, 2009). 
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applicable to eighteenth-century Britain, where most of Scotland and Wales, and substantial 
tracts of western and north-western England, exhibited precisely these features. Did (as Scott 
terms it) ‘the friction of terrain’ set substantial limits on the reach of the state and make these 
areas of Britain less governable, turning many regions on the periphery into ‘zones of relative 
autonomy’?11 Research on taxation, smuggling, relief systems and the building of certain 
types of institutions has begun to suggest that, to a limited extent at least, this might have 
been the case — a theme we will return to in the conclusion. In this article we will test the 
relevance of Scott’s ideas from a different angle by examining whether the inhabitants of the 
periphery were also able to exhibit a large measure of autonomy in another key arena — in 
their use of the state’s ultimate sanction, the gallows. 
 
I 
Although this study also briefly analyses both non-property crime and the period after 1775, 
it focusses primarily on the treatment of the main group targeted by the Bloody Code — 
property offenders — and on the third quarter of the eighteenth century, which is the first 
period for which systematic records are available. It is only after 1750 that a unique and 
under-exploited source — the Sheriffs’ Cravings and their associated Sheriffs’ Assize 
Calendars — enable us to gather reliable data about almost every English county.12 These 
records were created because each county’s sheriff could, and did, claim back from the 
Treasury the costs incurred in hanging or otherwise punishing all assize convicts. When 
submitting their expense claims (or ‘cravings’), the sheriffs included the assize calendars as 
                                                          
11 Scott, The Art, pp. ix, 2. 
12 The National Archives, London, (hereafter TNA), Sheriffs’ Cravings, T 64/262, T 90/148–
166, and Sheriffs’ Assize Calendars, E 389/242–248. 
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supporting evidence of the punishments meted out, and these calendars therefore constituted, 
as William Blackstone noted, ‘the only warrant that the sheriff has, for so material an act as 
taking the life away of another.’13 The cravings and associated calendars, when combined 
with the records of the Welsh Great Sessions, the Cheshire and Lancashire Palatinate 
jurisdictions, the Durham data in the 1819 Report, and the London data kindly made available 
by Simon Devereaux, enable us to count the number of hangings that occurred in each county 
of England and Wales between 1751 and 1775, and to calculate county-based execution rates 
both for property crimes under the ‘Bloody Code’ and for other offences — primarily 
murder.14 Since Rachel Bennett, who is currently conducting a Ph.D. on Scottish execution 
                                                          
13 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4 vols. (Oxford, 1765–9), iv, 
p. 369. The cravings — lists of all the yearly costs claimed by the sheriff — were also 
accompanied by receipts for gaoler’s bills, maintenance work and other punishment-related 
outlays. See, for example, TNA, E 389/245/1–24.  
14 National Library of Wales (hereafter NLW), Great Sessions 4 (county Gaol Files), included 
within the Crime and Punishment in Wales online database (hereafter Crime and Punishment 
in Wales), http://www.llgc.org.uk/sesiwn_fawr/index_s.htm (accessed 7 Nov. 2013); TNA, 
PL 28/2–3, CHES 21/7, DURH 16/1–2; Parl. Papers, ‘Criminal Laws’, viii (585), (1819), 
236–50. We are very grateful to Simon Devereaux for providing us with his database of 
London capital convictions. E. A. Wrigley, ‘English County Populations in the Later 
Eighteenth Century’, Economic History Review, lx, (2007), 54–5, has supplied the population 
data needed. The only gap in the cravings-based data is the nineteen towns and cities which 
could pass death sentences outside of the county assize, since the executions in these places 
were not included within the cravings. These jurisdictions have therefore been excluded from 
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and post-execution practices 1740–1832 has kindly let us quote the execution figures she has 
already gathered from the Justiciary court records between 1750 and 1770, we are also able to 
present some preliminary findings from north of the border.15  
Focussing on the period 1750–75 is also useful for other reasons. It was a period of 
relative stability for the capital code. The use of hanging altered fundamentally between the 
late sixteenth and the early eighteenth centuries. According to Philip Jenkins’ estimates, 
national hanging rates peaked at between 25 and 30 per 100,000 population per year in the 
crisis period around 1600.16 However, they then rapidly declined to about 10 per 100,000 in 
the 1630s, to under 5 by 1700, and to 1.3 by 1750, after which they remained very stable until 
the late 1770s.17 By 1750 capital punishment was playing a completely different role to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the county population estimates against which county-by-county execution rates were 
calculated. 
15 Our thanks to Rachel Bennett. Her Wellcome Trust-funded Ph.D. thesis is on ‘Death, 
Execution and the Criminal Corpse: Understanding Post-Mortem Punishment in Scotland 
1745–1832’ (forthcoming, Univ. of Leicester). Also useful but incomplete is Alex F. Young, 
The Encyclopaedia of Scottish Executions 1750–1963 (Orpington, 1998).  
16 Philip Jenkins, ‘From Gallows to Prison? The Execution Rate in Early Modern England’, 
Criminal Justice History, vii, (1986), 52, 56; J. A. Sharpe, Judicial Punishment in England 
(London, 1990), 27–36. 
17 Jenkins, ‘From Gallows’, 61 — since these national estimates were based mainly on areas 
which this article identifies as having higher than average hanging rates they may 
overestimate absolute levels but probably remain a good guide to change over time. Sharpe’s 
work on Cheshire which (like Jenkins’ figures) does not differentiate between executions for 
property crime and executions for non-property crime broadly confirms Jenkins’ estimates. 
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one it had performed in 1600. As David Garland has pointed out, the English state was 
rapidly moving on from its ‘early modern stage’, in which the state frequently used rituals of 
execution to assert its claims to authority and to impress the populace.18 By 1750 it had 
embraced instead a range of penal policy options within which the death penalty was no 
longer ‘an unquestionable expression of sovereign power but a policy tool like any other.’19 
Following its introduction as a formal sentencing option in 1718, transportation had quickly 
come to dominate the courts’ sentencing practices and for the first time those who felt 
hanging was too severe a punishment for property crime had access to a tough secondary 
punishment which could act as an effective alternative.20 Since attitudes temporarily grew 
harsher in the early 1780s following the transportation crisis created by the American War 
and the panic about rising crime rates that followed demobilisation in 1782, the period of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Cheshire execution rates were 4 to 5 times greater in 1580–1640 than in 1690–1709 (1.5 per 
100,000 per year). See J. A. Sharpe, Crime in Early Modern England 1550–1750, 2nd edn. 
(London, 1999), 90–2. Between 1750 and 1775 the Cheshire figure (0.54) for all types of 
offender was less than half the national average. Our 1750–75 data suggests an overall figure 
of 1.2 for all types of offenders and 0.9 for property crime alone. 
18 David Garland, ‘Modes of Capital Punishment: The Death Penalty in Historical 
Perspective’, in Garland, McGowen and Meranze (eds.), America’s Death Penalty. 
19 Ibid., 51. Hanging was still a useful selective instrument of penal policy (Hay, ‘Property, 
Authority’; King, Crime, Justice) but, as Fielding pointed out, the gallows rituals no longer 
worked very well as a ceremonial celebration of state power — see Henry Fielding, ‘An 
Enquiry into the Causes of the Late Increase in Robbers’, in W. Henley (ed.), The Complete 
Works of Henry Fielding (New York, 1902), pp. xiii, 122–5. 
20  Beattie, Crime and the Courts, 620; King, Crime, Justice, 264;   
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remarkable stability in hanging rates between 1750 and the late 1770s is the best period to 
test underlying attitudes to capital punishment for property offenders, and ideas about its 
correct place within the broader range of eighteenth-century penal options.  
 
II 
The systematic county-based data on England and Wales 1750–75, seen in Map 1, indicates 
that there were clear and stark regional contrasts in the use of capital punishment for property 
offenders. If historians had analysed the scattered data on areas outside south-eastern England 
available in the 1819 Report they would have seen several important clues about this. For 
example, between 1753 and 1782 the report records that only one property offender was 
hanged on the Brecon Circuit (Glamorgan, Radnor and Brecon), while ninety-nine went to 
the gallows in Essex, despite the fact that Essex’s population was less than twice as large.21 
Map 1 makes it clear that this immense contrast is in no way untypical. In London around 
                                                          
21 Parl. Papers, ‘Criminal Laws’, viii (585), (1819), 254–5. Two others were recorded as 
guilty of ‘Felony’ but no punishment is listed. Essex numbers based on assize records as 
listed in King, Crime, Justice, 133. For another contrast — Beattie, Crime and the Courts, 
536–7 states that Surrey hanged 101 property offenders in the years 1749–75, while in 
Durham (according to Parl. Papers, ‘Criminal Laws’, viii, (585), (1819), 242–4) there were 
only two hangings for property crimes between 1755 and 1775. Contemporaries usually 
argued that the parliamentary returns would slightly overestimate the number of hangings 
because ‘the King’s pardon may have been sent without the knowledge of the clerk of assize’. 
See Parl. Papers, ‘Criminal Laws’, viii (585), (1819), 101. However, the actual Durham 
number may have been three: TNA, DURH 16/1–2 and Maureen Anderson, Durham 
Executions from 1700 to 1900 (Barnsley, 2007), 22–5. 
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590 property offenders went to the gallows 1750–75. In Merioneth, Glamorgan and 
Anglesey, no property offenders were hanged in that period. In operational terms the Bloody 
Code in these places was a dead letter. In the counties of Monmouthshire, Montgomeryshire, 
Westmorland, Breconshire, Pembrokeshire and Denbighshire only one person went to the 
gallows for property crime in these twenty-six years. Nor can these differences be put down 
merely to different population sizes. Execution rates per head of population were hugely 
different. Executions per 100,000 population per year in London, the area with the highest 
rate, were over fifty times higher (at 3.85) than the average rate (0.07) for the ten counties 
with the lowest rates, namely Cornwall, Westmorland, Durham, Montgomeryshire, 
Pembrokeshire, Denbighshire, Northumberland, Anglesey, Glamorganshire and 
Merionethshire. The inhabitants of almost all these ten counties could expect, at most, to see 
one hanging for property crime in their county during their adult lifetime. In several counties 
they would never see one. Nor was this absence of visible examples compensated for by the 
gibbeting of the few property offenders who did reach the gallows. Between 1750 and 1775 
no property offenders were gibbeted in Wales, Cornwall or Cumberland.22  
 
[INSERT MAP 1, with the following title and footnote: Map 1. County Execution Rates for 
all Property Offences, England and Wales, 1750–7523] 
 
                                                          
22 TNA, Sheriffs’ Cravings, T 64/262, T 90/148–166, and Sheriffs’ Assize Calendars, E 
389/242–248; Crime and Punishment in Wales (accessed 7 Nov. 2013). 
23 See the sources cited in note 14. We are extremely grateful to Dr Ben Wheeler of the 
European Centre for Environment and Human Health, University of Exeter Medical School, 
for generating the map (using ArcGIS 10.1 — ESRI, Redlands, CA). 
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The geography of the Bloody Code in the third quarter of the eighteenth century 
exhibited a truly stark centre/periphery divide. These were different worlds. In London (3.85 
per 100,000 population) and in three counties nearest to it — Surrey (1.98), Hertfordshire 
(1.58) and Essex (1.51) — the gallows were extremely regularly used against property 
offenders. Here the Bloody Code was a major plank of penal policy. In many counties on the 
western periphery, i.e. the far West and North-West of England and most of central and 
western Wales, it was virtually unused. However, behind this incredibly sharp contrast 
between the metropolis and the sparsely populated rural and mainly pastoral West and North-
West lay a more subtle general pattern. The impact of the Bloody Code was like the ripples 
caused by a stone thrown into a pond. At the centre the water was greatly disturbed, but while 
the impact was still significant in the immediate regions around the capital — especially in 
the southern counties, and in the East Midlands — the resistance of distance (as Scott has 
termed it) meant that it rapidly fell away as one moved into northern England, into the South-
West (Devon excepted), or into Wales. London’s annual rate of executions for property crime 
was around twenty times greater than that found both in Lancashire and in the Midlands 
counties of Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire and Leicestershire. In the far North 
(Northumberland, Cumberland, Westmorland and Durham) it was over thirty times. 
Journeying west from London produced a smaller initial drop, but by the time we reach the 
far western county of Cornwall the figure was thirty-two times greater.24 Journeying into 
                                                          
24 London’s rates were four times higher than those in Gloucestershire, Wiltshire, 
Oxfordshire and Hampshire. A similar pattern is found to the east. London’s annual rate of 
executions for property crime was between two and three times that of Surrey and Essex, but 
it was more than eleven times greater than in the rest of East Anglia — Suffolk, Norfolk, 
Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire. 
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Wales produced an even greater fall. The London rate was thirty-five times greater than it 
was in the five counties on the western seaboard of Wales — Anglesey, Caernarvonshire, 
Merionethshire, Cardiganshire and Pembrokeshire.25 In three Welsh counties there were no 
executions at all and Wales’s reputation as ‘the land of the white gloves’ was clearly well 
deserved.26 This ripple effect was not uniform. Counties like Devon and Radnorshire stand 
out as exceptions with less drastic differences in relation to London. Overall, however, there 
can be no doubt that historians have greatly underestimated the significance of the regional 
dimension of the capital code in this period. 
The Scottish data is more provisional but if we begin in 1755 instead of 1750 in order 
to avoid the immediate aftermath of the 1745 Jacobite Rebellion, which temporarily 
increased the willingness of the Highland authorities to hang property offenders, it is clear 
that the Scots were even less willing to use the capital sanction than the Welsh (Table 1).27 
The annual rate of executions for property offences in England 1755–75 was 0.81. In Wales it 
was five times lower at 0.16, and in Scotland it was nine times lower at 0.09 (1755–70).28 
                                                          
25 The ratio was equally great in relation to central and southern Wales. 
26 White gloves were traditionally given to the assize judge if the assizes had been a ‘Maiden’ 
one with no capital convictions: see Jones, Crime in Nineteenth-Century Wales, 1. It was 
custom for the sheriff to pay 5s. ‘Glove Money’ at the conclusion of a Maiden assizes. This 
was frequently charged by sheriffs in the cravings, but never allowed by the Treasury — 
TNA, T 90/168. 
27 Rachel Bennett’s data on hangings recorded in the Justiciary records in the period 1755–70 
is used here. 
28 Gatrell noted in passing that ‘Scotland had few hangings anyway,’ — The Hanging Tree, p. 
ix.  
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Anne Crowther’s observation that in the early nineteenth century the Scottish courts were 
reluctant ‘to employ capital punishment on anything like the scale of England’ is clearly even 
more applicable to the third quarter of the eighteenth century, while Anne-Marie Kilday’s 
suggestion that Scottish justice ‘was more … exacting’ than ‘the infamous Bloody Code’, 
gets no support from this data.29 Even though the absolute numbers involved are very low 
there were also significant regional differences in execution rates for property crime within 
Scotland. Once the Jacobite Rebellion was a decade away, the Northern and Western Circuits 
both had incredibly low rates of 0.05, but the Scottish Home Circuit (which included the 
capital Edinburgh) had an overall rate more than four times greater at 0.21 — a differential 
pattern that was still in place in 1805 when parliamentary returns first offer data on 
Scotland.30 Thus, within Scotland the centre and the more highly cultivated lowlands once 
again had higher rates than the western and northern periphery. The contrast between 
southern, metropolitan England and the Scottish Highlands was truly enormous, the overall 
Highlands rate being seventy-five times lower than that in London.31 The Scottish data 
therefore reinforces our picture of the marginal role played by the Bloody Code on the 
                                                          
29 Crowther, ‘Crime, Prosecution’, 21; Kilday, ‘Contemplating the Evil’, 152. 
30 In the years 1805–14 there were no executions in the Northern Division of Scotland and the 
North-Western and North-Eastern divisions averaged 0.08, the Glasgow area 0.28 and the 
South-Eastern division (encompassing Edinburgh) 0.46: see Parl. Papers, ‘A Return of 
Persons … to the Several Gaols in Scotland’, x (45), (1812–13), 217–32, and Parl. Papers, 
‘A Return of Persons … to the Several Gaols in Scotland’, xi (163), (1814–15), 293–312. 
31 Using population estimates for 1760 based on J. Kyd (ed.), Scottish Population Statistics 
including Webster’s Analysis of Population 1755 (Edinburgh, 1952), 82 and the Scottish 
Justiciary records. 
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northern and western periphery of Britain in the third quarter of the eighteenth century. 
However, the geography of executions for non-property crime — primarily murder — was 
very different. When it came to responding to homicide, spatial differences were much less 
important and attitudes were more uniform. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
 
The western and northern counties of England and Wales showed little reluctance to 
send murderers to the gallows, and as a result hangings for murder played a larger role in 
executions on the periphery than they did at the centre. In Glamorgan between 1750 and 1775 
all of the five executions were for murder. In Monmouthshire the figure was 80 per cent; in 
Westmorland, Montgomeryshire and Caernarvonshire 50 per cent; in Cornwall 42 per cent. 
The contrast with counties near to London was stark. In Essex only 9 per cent of hangings 
were for murder, in London only 12 per cent. In England and Wales as a whole, 19 per cent 
of hangings were for homicide. On the Home Circuit the figure was 17 per cent; on the 
Western Circuit 25; on the Northern Circuit 35; in Wales 41; in Scotland 53.32 At the centre 
hangings were clearly about preserving property, but as we move away from London the 
gallows ceased to be dominated by those executed for property crimes and became 
increasingly an eye for an eye matter.33 If you killed someone and were then found guilty of 
                                                          
32 Scottish figure based on the years 1755–70. 
33 Hanging rates per 100,000 population per year for murderers also reflected this. 
Unsurprisingly, given what we know about the urban dominance of homicide indictment 
rates, Middlesex had the highest rate of executions for murder (0.57). However, areas like 
16 
 
murder rather than manslaughter you would almost certainly hang in later eighteenth-century 
Britain. The extreme reluctance to hang property offenders found in many regions on the 
periphery was not therefore a product of a general refusal to use the gallows under any 
circumstances. Nor was there a reluctance to make the execution of murderers more visible 
by hanging them in chains. Fifteen of the 134 murderers gibbeted in England and Wales 
between 1752 and 1834 were from areas on the periphery.34 
 
III 
 The lack of systematic pre-1750 sources makes it almost impossible to determine whether 
this highly polarised centre/periphery pattern in relation to the hanging of property offenders 
had been in existence for some time.35 What is much clearer, however, is that during the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Monmouthshire (0.54), Radnorshire (0.40) and Glamorganshire (0.33) were all in the top ten 
counties and while the ripple effect was hardly noticeable at all. 
34 In other words, between the introduction of the Murder Act in 1752 (which directed that 
executed murderers should be subjected to the further punishment of either dissection or 
hanging in chains) and the abolition of hanging in chains as a punishment in 1834 — see 
TNA, Sheriffs’ Cravings, T 64/262, T 90/148–166, and Sheriffs’ Assize Calendars, E 
389/242–248; Crime and Punishment in Wales (accessed 7 Nov. 2013). 
35 If Howard’s research on rural Denbighshire 1660–1730 is any guide, differences may have 
existed earlier. Her work suggests a minimum execution rate for property offenders of 0.42 
per 100,000 while the 1819 returns indicate the Home Counties rate 1689–1718 was 2.90 — 
Sharon Howard, Law and Disorder in Early Modern Wales: Crime and Authority in the 
Denbighshire Courts c.1660–1730 (Cardiff, 2008), 133–5; Parl. Papers, ‘Criminal Laws’, 
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crisis of the 1780s, when large-scale demobilisation was accompanied by rapidly rising crime 
rates and increasingly severe punishment policies, the Bloody Code not only claimed many 
more lives in south-eastern England but also made some limited inroads into penal policy on 
the margins.36 The combination of poor harvests and post-war demobilisation in 1782–3 
brought rapidly increasing indictment rates for capital property crimes in London, and on the 
Home and Norfolk Circuits.37 This would have led to rising execution rates for property 
crime even if punishment policies had not grown harsher, but this period also witnessed a 
considerable rise in the proportion of capital convicts left for execution.38 This partly 
reflected changing government policy. In 1782 the administration announced its 
determination to offer ‘no pardon’ to those found guilty of robbery and other capital 
offences.39 In 1785 the Home Circuit judges — partly in response to Martin Madan’s 
pamphlet demanding that no capital offenders be pardoned — announced that they would be 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
viii (585), (1819), 164–7. Population estimates taken from P. Deane and W. Cole, British 
Economic Growth 1688–1959, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, 1967), 103. 
36 The 1819 returns contain good data for an increasing number of areas by the final quarter 
of the eighteenth century, and Figures 1 and 2 use this data, along with pre-1780 information 
from the sheriffs’ expense records. 
37 Well discussed in Douglas Hay, ‘War, Dearth and Theft in the Eighteenth Century: The 
Record of the English Courts’, Past and Present, xc (1982). 
38 On the Home Circuit it rose by a third. On the Norfolk Circuit it increased by 50 per cent: 
see King, Crime, Justice, 275, and Hay, ‘Hanging’, 134. 
39 Ipswich Journal, 14 Aug. and 23 Nov. 1782; Simon Devereaux, ‘In Place of Death: 
Transportation, Penal Practices and the English State 1770–1830’, in Carolyn Strange (ed.), 
Qualities of Mercy: Justice, Punishment and Discretion (Vancouver, 1996), 57. 
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following precisely that policy and then hanged all those they had sentenced to death at the 
Essex, Kent and Sussex assizes.40  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
 
This policy of extreme severity was immediately attacked in the press and was soon 
modified, but its effect, along with the rise in capital indictments, was to create the large rise 
in execution rates for property crime seen in Figure 1.41 In London and on the Home and 
Norfolk Circuits they more than doubled, peaking in the five years centring on 1785 at 
around 9 and 4 and 2 per 100,000 per annum.42 The fourth and lowest line on Figure 1 which 
                                                          
40 King, Crime, Justice, 276–7; Chelmsford Chronicle, 1 and 8 July 1785 announced these 
two judges’ imminent arrival but then noted that Mansfield was retained on business in 
London. Mansfield joined Eyre at the next assizes in Kent. TNA, ASSI 31/14 and Chelmsford 
Chronicle, 15 July 1785. They then hanged fourteen of the seventeen sentenced to death at 
the last assizes on the circuit in Surrey. The Home Secretary clearly backed Lord Mansfield’s 
view that ‘the judges ought not to interpose discretionary mercy, but leave the law to take its 
course’ — Chelmsford Chronicle, 29 July 1785 and TNA, HO 13/3/167–8, 172–3; HO 
47/2/222. 
41 The Times, 20 Sept. and 20 Oct. 1785, 9 Jan. 1786. In London, 1785 saw a doubling of the 
number hanged and 1787 witnessed a similar number before a return to the levels found in 
the late 1770s: see Simon Devereaux, ‘Imposing the Royal Pardon: Execution, Transportation 
and Convict Resistance in London, 1789’, Law and History Review, xxv (2007), 122. 
42 To iron out large year-on-year differences a five-year moving average has been used in 
Figures 1 and 2. 
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represents the pattern in the five counties on the periphery with the best data — Cornwall, 
Westmorland and the three Brecon Circuit counties — had rarely crept above 0.1 in the 
twenty years before 1782 and had been 0.0 for over half a decade up to that point. However, 
although the levels reached were still extremely small compared to the other circuits in Figure 
1, and although the change came somewhat later, this pattern was eroded in the later 1780s as 
overall execution rates for property crime in these five peripheral counties rose to a peak of 
0.66 around 1789. Figure 2, which magnifies the scale and allows us to look at the Cornwall 
and Brecon Circuit patterns individually, indicates that these two areas followed a very 
similar path. Rising indictment rates probably played a role in generating these patterns, but 
once again the policies of certain judges also had an influence. In the mid-1780s a 
Montgomeryshire judge announced that ‘hanging was again a necessary expedient’ and the 
Brecon Circuit judge, George Hardinge gave repeated warnings of his ‘determination to 
execute.’43 In 1789, having described his disgust at the ‘dangerous lenity’ inherent in the fact 
that ‘no capital punishment had been inflicted’ for sheep stealing ‘these twenty or thirty 
years,’ Hardinge promptly broke this pattern by leaving two sheep stealers to hang.44 There 
                                                          
43 Jones, ‘Life and Death’, 542. 
44 TNA, HO 47/8/15. Hardinge was correct — Parl. Papers, ‘Criminal Laws’, viii (585), 
(1819), 254–7, indicates that none of the twenty sheep stealers sentenced to hang on the 
Brecon Circuit in the years 1753–88 were executed. In England in the years 1740–80 less 
than 10 per cent were executed (King, Crime, Justice, 274) but in the mid-1780s this rose to 
20 per cent and continued at this level into the 1790s (Hay, ‘Hanging’, 135). 
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were clearly good reasons why Byron made Hardinge the model for ‘Judge Jefferies 
Hardiman’ in his poem Don Juan.45  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2] 
 
By 1790 execution rates everywhere had fallen back to pre-crisis levels (Figure 1), but 
the period 1800–1 witnessed a brief resurgence of provincial execution rates. On the Brecon 
Circuit, where no property offenders were executed between 1792 and 1796, rates briefly 
peaked at over 0.6, while in Cornwall and on the Home Circuit they more than doubled, in 
part because of a similar (if less drastic) change of policy to that seen in the early 1780s. 
Faced by severe dearth, food riots and rising crime rates, Lord Kenyon announced a ‘rigorous 
execution of the laws,’ and in Wales Judge Hardinge was again prominent in pursuing stricter 
policies.46 In 1801 he hanged two Merthyr food rioters for robbery, because he believed that 
‘it would be dangerous to intimate that, where a hope to reduce the market price is the sole 
object, a rioter will be deemed innocent who pursues that object by force.’47 However, in 
                                                          
45 G. Byron, Don Juan (1819–24), xiii, stanza 88. Two years later Hardinge used the absence 
of indictments since he executed these two sheep stealers to claim this had worked as a 
deterrent. However, it seems unlikely that the hill farmers of Wales suddenly gave up their 
regular habit of stealing one another’s sheep (Jones, ‘Life and Death’, 540) and more likely 
that Welsh victims, finding execution repugnant, were dissuaded from prosecuting. 
46 King, Crime, Justice, 277. 
47 Hardinge referred to his duty to guard ‘the properties of men against that worst of all 
tyrants — a rabble unlawfully assembled’, and made it clear that this was not about punishing 
property crime or about the character of the accused but about social control in a period of 
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1802, as food prices returned to normal and the rioting ceased, this stricter policy disappeared 
and hanging rates settled down at new lower levels. 
  In the period that followed, execution levels remained significant in London and on 
the Home Circuit, averaging between 0.8 and 1.3 between 1805 and 1815.48 On the 
periphery, by contrast, execution rates returned to the negligible levels of the period 1750–75. 
When contemporary newspapers reported in 1785 that ‘there had not been an execution in the 
county of Anglesey for upwards of thirty years’ and in 1822 that ‘an execution had not 
occurred at Presteign for the last seventeen years’ they were not pedalling a convenient myth 
but reflecting ground-level experience.49 Overall therefore, between the mid-eighteenth 
century and the late 1820s (with the exception of brief periods in the 1780s and 1800–1) the 
hanging of property offenders followed a very different pattern on the periphery to that 
observed at the centre. On the western and northern periphery of England, in most of Wales 
and in Scotland outside the south-central belt the Bloody Code was very rarely activated in 
relation to property offenders. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
widespread riots and incendiarism. ‘Mr Justice Hardinge’s Address to the Convicts … 
Cardiff Sessions 8 April 1801’, in G. Parry, Launched to Eternity: Crime and Punishment 
1700–1900 (Aberystwyth, 2001), 26. Hardinge reduced the court to tears — see The Diaries 
of John Bird 1790–1803, ed. Hilary M. Thomas (Cardiff, 1987), 130. 
48 A change described by Devereaux as ‘a retreat in the scale of execution that constituted a 
kind of dress rehearsal for the real changes of the 1820s and 1830s’ — Simon Devereaux, 
‘Recasting the Theatre of Execution: The Abolition of the Tyburn Ritual’, Past and Present, 
ccii (2009), 174. 
49 The Times, 4 Oct. 1785; The Cambrian, 4 May 1822. See also a thirty-year Brecon claim in 
A Circumstantial Account of … the Trial of Lewis Lewis (Brecon, 1789). 
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IV 
Explaining these huge differences in the use of the Bloody Code between the centre and the 
periphery involves peeling away a succession of layers within the deeply discretionary 
process that was the eighteenth-century criminal law, and addressing a range of questions. 
Were fewer crimes committed on the periphery, or were the inhabitants of those areas less 
inclined to prosecute property offenders? If they did decide to prosecute, were they less 
willing to choose a capital charge? Were the local magistracy more inclined to divert 
potential felony accusations at the committal stage? At the assizes were the grand jurors more 
willing to dismiss the accusation as ‘not found’, and if the indictment was sent on to the petty 
jurors were they less willing to convict, and/or more willing to use partial verdicts to reduce 
the conviction to a non-capital one? Finally, once capitally convicted, were property 
offenders in these regions more likely to be pardoned? Some of these stages cannot be 
analysed quantitatively. For example, victim’s decisions about whether or not to prosecute 
were very rarely recorded and magistrates’ preliminary decisions are equally hard to 
reconstruct.50 However, jurors’ decisions can be analysed for a sample of counties, and the 
pardoning process can be fairly systematically surveyed through the sheriffs’ cravings, while 
one other potentially useful index — the parliamentary figures on county indictment rates — 
is also worth consideration.51 
  Unfortunately this indictment rate data only begins in 1805 and offers only one figure 
per county, which covers all felonies — including non-capital thefts, murder and other non-
                                                          
50 King, Crime, Justice, 18. 
51 Parl. Papers, ‘Criminal Laws’, viii (585), (1819), 133. 
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property offences.52 Overall, however, these figures confirm what we would expect from the 
work of J. M. Beattie and others on individual counties.53 Indictment rates per 100,000 
population between 1805 and 1811 were much higher in the predominantly urban counties 
and often lowest in the rural and pastoral ones of Wales and of the North and West of 
England.54 However, these differences in recorded crime rates in no way account for the huge 
differences in execution rates. In the counties of Kent, Surrey and Essex, for example, 
indictment rates 1805–11 were three times higher (at around 60 indictments per 100,000 
population per year) than those on the Brecon Circuit (which averaged 20 per 100,000). 
Execution rates 1750–75, by contrast, were twenty-one times higher in the former. 
Cornwall’s indictment rate (18 per 100,000) was eight times lower than London’s (142), yet 
its execution rate was thirty-two times lower.55 In the absence of comprehensive indictment 
                                                          
52 Non-property crimes were a small proportion of the overall figures but the county totals 
also included all minor theft tried at the quarter/borough sessions and the many non-capital 
ones heard at the assizes. 
53 Beattie, Crime and the Courts, 158–61; King, Crime, Justice, 138–45. 
54 Population estimates for each county for the middle year 1808 were calculated using 
figures for the year 1801 provided by Wrigley, ‘English County Populations’, and David 
Williams, ‘A Note on the Population of Wales, 1536–1801’, Bulletin of the Board of Celtic 
Studies, viii (1937), 359–63, combined with the figures for 1811 in the Census of that year, 
which can be found at Histpop, The Online Historical Population Reports Website (hereafter 
Histpop), http://www.histpop.org/ohpr/servlet/ (accessed 7 Nov. 2013). 
55 To give a further example, the average indictment rate in the northern counties of 
Cumberland, Westmorland, Durham and Northumberland was seven times lower than 
London’s, yet its execution rate was thirty-one times lower. 
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data for 1750–75 conclusions must be very tentative, but while indictment rates almost 
certainly played a substantial role in creating differences in execution rates between the 
centre and the periphery in the third quarter of the eighteenth century, it is clear that this was 
only part of the explanation. Although the lower indictment rates found on the periphery may 
have been partly a response to the longer journeys usually necessary to find a magistrate in 
upland areas, they were also evidence of different underlying attitudes. A number of 
historians have argued that various areas on the periphery dealt with a higher proportion of 
potentially serious crimes informally, using informal compensation or community-based 
punishments — such as ceffyl pren — to avoid taking offenders to the formal courts, and 
these informal approaches in their turn may well have been founded on a deep opposition 
towards the capital code in relation to property offenders and a consequent commitment to 
avoid indictment whenever possible.56 
The data on jury decision-making at the centre and on the periphery seen in Tables 2a 
and 2b, which is based on four contrasting areas — London and Essex at the centre, and 
Cornwall and Wales on the periphery — indicates that both grand and petty jurors played a 
vital role in the creation of the highly polarised execution rates seen in Map 1.57 
                                                          
56 On the strong Welsh traditions of informal punishment, compounding, etc. see Sharon 
Howard, ‘Investigating Responses to Theft in Early Modern Wales: Communities, Thieves 
and Courts’, Continuity and Change, xix (2004), 413–15; Jones, Crime in Nineteenth-
Century Wales, 2–13. 
57 Using selected raids into the labyrinthine records of different assize circuits — TNA, ASSI 
23/6–7, ASSI 31/2–11, ASSI 94/782–900; along with the Old Bailey Proceedings Online, 
‘Statistics Search’, tabulating verdict category where offence category is burglary, 
housebreaking and theft from a specified place, between 1750 and 1775, and counting by 
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Unfortunately not found indictments were often thrown away and only two of these four 
areas — Wales and Essex — can be used to look at grand jury decisions. The results are, 
however, extremely thought-provoking. On the Brecon Circuit 1750–60, 34.2 per cent of 
assizes indictments were ‘not found’ by the grand jury.58 In the same period at the Essex 
assizes only 11.9 per cent of offenders avoided punishment in this way — a similar figure to 
that found by Beattie in Surrey over the period 1660–1800.59 Overall, therefore, Welsh 
defendants were three times more likely to escape a public trial because of the leniency of the 
local grand juries.60 
The petty jurors had more options. If they did not want to put the offender at risk of 
being hanged, they frequently resorted to the use of a partial verdict, reducing the offence in 
order to avoid a capital sentence. Some capital offences, most notably horse and sheep 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
verdict; and Crime and Punishment in Wales, searching the database for the offence 
categories of burglary, housebreaking and theft from a dwelling house, 1750–75. 
58 Minkes, ‘Wales’, 693 lists a further fifty-six cases in which the result was not recorded. 
These have been excluded from the calculation.  
59 TNA, ASSI 35/189–215; 11.5 per cent of Surrey capital property crimes indictments were 
dismissed by the grand jury 1660–1800: see Beattie, Crime and the Courts, 404. The figure 
for all property crime indictments was higher at 15.2 per cent. It is conceivable that some 
Essex not found indictments were not kept. 
60 This difference may have had a long history. 28 per cent of known verdicts in 
Denbighshire 1670–1730 were not found: see Howard, Law and Disorder, 134. In Essex 
1620–80 the figure could be as low as 9 and 17 per cent: see J. A. Sharpe, Crime in 
Seventeenth-Century England: A County Study (Cambridge, 1983), 96, 108. 
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stealing, were very difficult to redefine.61 The same was true of robbery. It was widely 
believed in this period that ‘robbery could not be reduced to simple theft’ and partial verdicts 
were very rare.62 By contrast, in housebreaking and burglary cases juries frequently brought 
in verdicts such as ‘guilty of stealing only, not guilty of breaking and entering,’ and the same 
was true of stealing in the dwelling house without breaking in, which was only a capital 
offence if the goods stolen were worth at least 40s.63 Since these four offences — robbery, 
burglary, housebreaking and stealing from a dwelling house — were also the main forms of 
property crime that created large numbers of capital convictions in both rural and urban areas 
this analysis focusses mainly on them.64  
                                                          
61 Occasionally juries tried to redefine the nature of the stolen beast (e.g. describing a horse as 
a mule) but these offences very rarely resulted in partial verdicts: see Beattie, Crime and the 
Courts, 428–9. Over 200 cases of horse and sheep theft in Surrey 1660–1800 produced no 
partial verdicts. In Essex partial verdict rates 1740–1805 were 1.5 per cent for horse theft, 2.7 
per cent for sheep theft, but 33.7 per cent for housebreaking and burglary together: see King, 
Crime, Justice, 232. 
62 Beattie, Crime and the Courts, 429. In Essex 1.4 per cent of robbery cases 1740–1805 
ended in a partial verdict: see King, Crime, Justice, 232. 
63  Juries often brought in verdicts of ‘guilty of stealing goods to the value of 39s.’ even when 
the evidence clearly indicated the goods were worth much more: Beattie, Crime and the 
Courts, 424. 
64 Shoplifting and pickpocketing also had to involve goods above a minimum value to be 
capital and were therefore targets for partial verdicts  but these charges were very rare in rural 
England: Beattie, Crime and the Courts, 168; King, Crime, Justice, 139. 
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When the data for both grand and petty jury decisions is put together a quite startling 
difference emerges for the offence that was the greatest source of candidates for the gallows 
— robbery. As Table 2a indicates, the Welsh jurors, both petty and grand, made huge efforts 
to prevent offenders being found guilty of robbery. The Welsh grand jurors rejected an 
astounding 66 per cent of the robbery indictments as ‘not found’, whereas their Essex 
equivalents only allowed 11.2 per cent of the accused to escape in this way. Welsh petty 
jurors were equally generous. Over two-thirds of those they tried were found not guilty 
compared to 34 per cent in Essex. Overall these two sets of decisions meant that only 11 per 
cent of Welsh robbers were found fully guilty and therefore at risk of being hanged. The 
Essex figure was over five times higher at 58 per cent.65   
 
[INSERT TABLES 2a and b]  
 
Essex and Wales may have been exceptional, but for petty jury decision-making alone 
all four sample counties can be used and a very similar pattern emerges. Table 2b compares 
Cornish, Welsh, London and Essex partial verdicts, acquittals and full convictions for the 
three most important types of capital case in which a partial verdict was a viable option — 
burglary, housebreaking and stealing from the dwelling house — and although sample sizes 
are inevitably smaller in Cornwall and Wales the pattern is clear. In Cornwall over 56 per 
cent of these offenders were given partial verdicts, compared to less than a third in London. 
Welsh jurors mainly used a different method — they were much more willing to fully acquit 
                                                          
65 This pattern can also be seen in cases involving burglary, the offence that produced more 
capital convictions in Essex than any other apart from robbery. Here the overall figures were 
25 per cent in Wales and 50 per cent in Essex. 
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these types of offenders. While only 20 per cent of Essex offenders were fully acquitted, in 
Wales the figure was nearly 40 per cent. As a result of these different decisions, overall less 
than a fifth of Cornish offenders and only a quarter of Welsh ones suffered a full capital 
conviction for these offences, compared to 38 and 41 per cent in London and Essex (Table 
2b). 
 ‘The independence of juries should not be overestimated,’ Gatrell has argued, but in 
areas such as Wales and Cornwall historians may well have underestimated it.66 Grand and 
petty juries on the periphery deliberately ensured that a very much smaller proportion of 
indictments for capital property crimes resulted in a hanging. ‘The jury’ Edward Thompson 
pointed out, ‘attends in judgement, not only on the accused, but also upon the justice and 
humanity of the Law.’67 The jurors of the periphery clearly found the Law wanting in both 
respects. Moreover, since prosecutors were drawn from much the same social groups as 
jurors, historians have suggested that they would have resembled jurors in their outlook.68 If 
this was the case prosecutors on the periphery would almost certainly have been more 
reluctant to prosecute, and more reluctant to use capital charges, which may help to explain 
why indictment rates for capital property crimes were much lower.69 It is therefore likely that 
the pattern of differential erosion in conviction rates for capital property offences, which we 
                                                          
66 Gatrell, The Hanging Tree, 523. 
67 E. P. Thompson, Writing by Candlelight (London, 1980), 108. 
68 Hay, ‘War, Dearth’, 154. 
69 Prosecutors may also have been more willing to create an acquittal by inadequately 
presenting the evidence at the assizes. 
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can definitely trace across jury decision-making, may well have begun much earlier in the 
prosecution process.70 
This pattern was also mirrored after the trial in the geography of pardoning. Between 
1760 and 1775 the proportion of capitally convicted property offenders that were actually 
hanged was much higher at the centre than on the periphery.71 The figure was lowest in 
London where only 52 per cent received a pardon. This may be partly due to the different 
ways that the pardoning process worked in the metropolis. In the provinces the key decisions 
were usually made by the assizes judge, but in London the Recorder reported to a committee 
which included key members of the government and the King himself.72 The attitudes and 
policy imperatives that leading political figures brought to these discussions, and the more 
diffuse nature of patronage networks in the metropolis, may well have been part of the reason 
                                                          
70Occasional remarks indicate potential links. ‘Hanging is at such a discount now’ one 
Scottish observer remarked, ‘that the prosecutor would have got no conviction unless he had 
restricted’ — Crowther, ‘Crime, Prosecution’, 27. 
71 Pardons and executions have been identified using the following sources: TNA, Sheriffs’ 
Cravings, T 64/262, T 90/148–166, Sheriffs’ Assize Calendars, E 389/242–248; Calendar of 
the Home Office Papers of the Reign of George III, 1766–1769, ed. Joseph Reddington 
(London, 1879); NLW, Great Sessions 4 (county Gaol Files), included within the Crime and 
Punishment in Wales website. Thanks again to Simon Devereaux for providing us with his 
database of London capital convictions.  
72 J. M. Beattie, Policing and Punishment in London 1660–1750 (Oxford, 2001), 346–7, and 
on the role of the Recorder, 450–2; Simon Devereaux, ‘Peel, Pardon and Punishment: The 
Recorder’s Report Revisited’ in Devereaux and Griffiths (eds.), Penal Practice, 258–84. 
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why pardons were more difficult to obtain.73 However, this cannot explain the systematic 
variations in pardoning rates outside London, where counties nearer to the capital also had 
much lower pardoning rates than those on the periphery. In the Home Circuit counties of 
Essex, Surrey and Hertfordshire, for example, the average was 70 per cent. By contrast in 
thirteen counties — all of which were on the periphery — over 85 per cent were pardoned. 
Denbighshire, Northumberland, Montgomeryshire, Cornwall and Monmouthshire had rates 
of 85 to 97 per cent, while in Glamorganshire, Anglesey, Merionethshire, Breconshire, 
Caernarvonshire, Pembrokeshire, Cumberland and Westmorland it was 100 per cent. These 
figures on overall pardoning rates need to be treated with care. Not all forms of property 
crime produced the same reprieve rates. In Essex two-fifths of robbery convicts and a third of 
burglars were hanged while only around a tenth of sheep stealers and horse thieves, and 
virtually none of those accused of privately stealing from shops or from people’s pockets 
went to the gallows.74 This meant that the types of capital convicts prevalent in a particular 
region had a big impact on overall hanging rates. However, there is clear evidence of major 
differences in hanging rates for the same offence between different types of area and 
particularly between the centre and the periphery. 
  To isolate those differences Table 3 compares pardoning rates between 1760 and 1775 
for each major category of capital offence in four different types of areas — Middlesex; five 
counties around London with low overall pardoning rates; five southern rural counties not 
                                                          
73 For a detailed analysis of the Prime Minister’s and the Home Secretary’s intervention 
leading to a hanging, albeit a provincial one — Drew Gray and Peter King, ‘The Killing of 
Constable Linnell: The Impact of Xenophobia and Elite Connections on Eighteenth-Century 
Justice’, Family and Community History, xvi (2013). 
74 The period covered was 1755–1815: see King, Crime, Justice, 274 
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adjacent to London; and fourteen high pardoning rate counties on the periphery. The pattern 
is clear. In almost every individual type of offence for which there are sufficient numbers to 
make meaningful comparisons, pardoning rates are much higher on the periphery than at the 
centre. Only about half of those accused of robbery or burglary in London avoided the 
gallows. On the periphery nearly two-thirds of robbers and seven out of every eight burglars 
were pardoned. Stealing from a specified place (almost always a dwelling house) led to 
pardons in three-fifths of London cases but always ended in a pardon on the periphery. 
Forgery followed roughly the same pattern, as did both horse stealing and housebreaking. 
Across all four types of areas in Table 3 pardoning rates tended to follow the pattern one 
would expect from the ripple effect observed earlier. Pardoning rates for burglary for 
example were 46 per cent in London, 64 around London, 78 in the rural counties and 88 per 
cent on the periphery. These results suggest that differences in overall pardoning rates were 
not created primarily by the different mixes of capital crimes in different regions but by real 
differences in pardoning polices between the centre and the periphery. Since the process of 
granting a pardon often implied, as Cesare Beccaria pointed out, a ‘tacit mark of disapproval’ 
towards the capital code itself, these differential pardoning rates may well be evidence of a 
much more widespread dislike of the capital code on the periphery.75  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
 
By analysing the large differences in ‘not found’ rates, in petty jury verdict patterns, 
in pardoning rates and in more general property crime prosecution rates between London and 
major parts of the periphery, this quantitative approach has begun to uncover the key 
                                                          
75 Radzinowicz, A History, i, p. 128. 
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mechanisms that led to the huge differences in execution rates for property crimes seen in 
Map 1. Individually they do not entirely explain the twenty- or thirty-fold differences 
between London and the far western periphery, but interactions between these different 
decision-making patterns almost certainly created a particularly potent set of mutually 
reinforcing mechanisms for mercy. If local preferences on the periphery reduced the 
proportion of victims willing to prosecute for property crimes (and the proportion using 
capital charges such as housebreaking), the much smaller assize calendars (and the lack of 
major capital charges within them) that resulted could generate very powerful arguments 
against the need to hang the few offenders who were capitally convicted. Petitions such as 
that sent to the Home Office by the sheriff of Cornwall pleading in mitigation ‘that the 
number of offences contained in the calendar at the late and the Spring assizes was very 
inconsiderable’ and ‘that the crime of housebreaking did not occur in the late calendar except 
in this single incidence,’ were not confined to the periphery, but they had particular force 
there because indictment rates were so much lower.76 Just as high indictment rates could lead 
to harsher pardoning policies, as they did in the 1780s, so low indictment rates in particular 
regions on the periphery tended to reduce the desire to actually hang property offenders. This 
mechanism, combined with the ways jurors on the periphery systematically reduced the 
proportion of offenders that were fully capitally convicted, seems to have created a scarcity 
of executions for property crime that sensitised the public in a unique way. If we turn to more 
qualitative sources, to the fragmentary insights contained in newspapers, government 
correspondence and more particularly in the pardoning archives, it becomes clear that 
communities on the periphery (and key officials such as the sheriffs) were particularly 
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sensitive to, and often willing to directly challenge, the use of capital punishment against 
routine property offenders.  
 
V 
Although the Home Office pardoning archives of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, and the more scattered pardoning papers that survive for the period before the 
establishment of the Home Office in 1782, only contain a relatively small number of cases 
from counties on the western and north-western periphery, they include important indications 
of the depth of communal hostility to the hanging of property offenders.77 This evidence on 
the cluster of attitudes most prevalent on the periphery is difficult to interpret, embedded as it 
often is within a range of issues raised by each specific case. Its typicality is also hard to 
gauge, in part because underlying attitudes were often only made explicit in moments of 
crisis. However, the private nature of the pardoning process did occasionally create records in 
which the role of local sentiment is explicitly revealed. The attitudes of the inhabitants of 
Cornwall, for example, come over clearly in the surviving letters relating to two offenders 
awaiting execution in 1767. ‘My Lord,’ a Cornish MP wrote,  
 
I beg the favour of you to intercede with His Majesty to … pardon the two 
criminals whose petitions I … inclose… I can’t avoid interceding for ’em [sic] as 
                                                          
77 Before 1782 the less complete pardoning records that survive are found mixed with other 
correspondence in the State Papers Domestic held at the TNA. On distribution between 
circuits of pardon requests see Simon Devereaux, ‘The Criminal Branch of the Home Office 
1782–1830’, in Greg T. Smith,  Allyson N. May and Simon Devereaux (eds.), Criminal 
Justice in the Old World and the New (Toronto, 1998), 297. 
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the Borough of Launceston which I represent, also that of Newport where I chuse 
[sic] two members both interest themselves that they should be saved. This you 
may imagine must make me anxious about it.78  
 
Borough elections could be expensive to win and the Launceston MP continued to come 
under tremendous local pressure.79 ‘The people of this neighbourhood are now more anxious 
than ever,’ he wrote a week later, ‘how apt they are to fancy one has not done one’s uttermost 
if one fails of success in a point they have set their hearts upon.’80  
By mobilising their MP in this way the local inhabitants succeeded in saving the 
sheep stealer Richard Williams, even though the judge had left him to hang.81 Local opinion 
clearly opposed his being sent to the gallows and it was local opinion that won the day in this 
case (though not in the case of the man capitally convicted for wrecking at the same 
assizes).82 Apart from one hanging in 1742, which occurred immediately after the passing of 
                                                          
78 TNA, SP 37/6/37–9. See also Calendar of Home Office Papers, 1766–1769, 184–8, 251. 
79 For the expense of elections that year see Public Advertiser, 11 Aug. 1767. Newport 
borough in Cornwall elected two members. 
80 TNA, SP 37/6/37–9. 
81 Calendar of  Home Office Papers 1766–1769, 256. The assize records (TNA, ASSI 23/7) 
for the summer assizes of 1767 indicate that two offenders were left to hang. However, the 
following assize records indicate that Williams was later transported.  
82 Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser, 4 Sept. 1767. There were limits to the impact of local 
opinion and William Pearce, who had stolen from a shipwreck, was still hanged despite the 
fact he was over 70. ‘The country people’ being ‘too numerous to be repelled’ had pillaged 
the stranded vessel and, ‘as there were many common people in court,’ the judge ‘took the 
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the 1741 Act that made sheep theft a capital offence, no other Cornish sheep stealer had been 
hanged under that act by 1767, and none would be, until the crackdown of the later 1780s.83 
Although sheep farming was an important part of the local economy many influential Cornish 
inhabitants clearly disagreed with the use of capital punishment against this crime.84 When a 
Cornish sheep stealer was again left to hang by the assize judge in 1786, ‘the general wishes 
of his neighbourhood to prevent his execution’ were vehemently expressed.85 In normal times 
(though not in the crisis of the 1780s) local opposition effectively turned the 1741 Act into a 
dead letter, as it did in Cumberland, and in most of the sheep-rearing counties of Wales, 
where there were no hangings of sheep thieves in the Act’s first forty years.86 In relation to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
opportunity of inveighing against so savage a crime, and of declaring publicly that no 
importunities whatever’ would induce him to reprieve. TNA, SP 37/6/41 and 37/6/45 for the 
government’s backing of the hanging. See also J. Rule, ‘Wrecking and Coastal Plunder’, in 
Hay et al. (eds.), Albion’s Fatal Tree, 168, 187. Pearce maintained he was innocent even on 
the gallows — Public Advertiser, 22 Oct. 1767. 
83 Radzinowicz, A History, i, pp. 675–8; TNA, ASSI 23/6–7; Parl. Papers, ‘Criminal Laws’, 
viii (585), (1819), 176–7. 
84 On average nearly one sheep thief a year was convicted in Cornwall 1760–85: TNA, ASSI 
23/6–7 (checked against notifications of pardons in TNA, SP 44/87–92 and E 389/243–5). 
85 TNA, HO 47/4/29.  
86 In March 1786 Judge Eyre — fresh from his policy of executing everyone on the Home 
Circuit in the previous year — came down on the Western Circuit and broke the pattern at the 
Cornwall assizes: seven sheep stealers were tried. He left two to hang. See Parl. Papers, 
‘Criminal Laws’, viii (585), (1819); TNA, ASSI 23/8, HO 47/4/29. The pattern was broken in 
1786 in Cumberland: see TNA, E 389/247, T 90/165; NLW, Crime and Punishment in Wales, 
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the Bloody Code more generally, outside the tiny minority of cases where the government 
was determined to make an example, and excluding brief periods of high tension such as the 
1780s, local opinion in areas like Wales and Cornwall seems to have played a considerable 
role in shaping everyday policies towards the execution of property offenders. This influence 
almost certainly grew in the early nineteenth century encouraged by the more general growth 
of opposition towards the capital code. 
Similar evidence about potent local opposition to executions for burglary can be seen 
in 1813 when William Morgan was left to hang at Cardiff against the explicit 
recommendation of the jury. The ‘public mind’ was described as having ‘very hostile 
feelings’ about ‘a man suffering death’ for this offence, and ‘strengthened by the decided 
voice of his own neighbourhood for saving his life,’ a large-scale petition by Cardiff’s 
inhabitants  was eventually successful. Even though the judges ‘thought it necessary … to 
make an example’, the Glamorgan jurors and petitioners won the day, their key counter-
arguments being that the condemned man himself was a ‘victim’ of this policy, and that ‘the 
execution of the sentence would undoubtedly operate unfavourably in this country by 
preventing prosecutions in future … and the frequency of such offences is certainly likely to 
be increased … by resorting to such extremes as will deter humane sufferers from arraigning 
future offenders.’87 In Caernarvon in 1822, it was reported that ‘in a county such as this, not 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
searching the database for the offence category of sheep-stealing, for the years 1730–1800.  
The inhabitants of these areas were not averse to finding sheep stealers guilty, the judges 
sometimes thought that Welsh jurors were too willing, but they did not usually want them 
hanged: see TNA, HO 47/6/4 and HO 47/16/28. 
87 TNA, HO 47/52/27. There are echoes here of the more general arguments put forward a 
few years later during the reform debate.  
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used to crime … the feelings of the people revolt at the idea’ of a highway robber being 
condemned to hang, since there had been ‘no execution in Caernarvon for the past twenty 
years.’88 In the same county in the following year a reprieve was obtained, against the judge’s 
wishes, for a man left for execution for stealing from a relative’s house after petitions were 
received from all levels of the society including many ‘country people at a loss for want of 
education.’ ‘Public humanity does not permit that judgement to be executed’ it was argued, 
while it was also stressed that in places such as this, where an execution for property crime 
very seldom occurred, ‘everyone connected with the country’ was desperately keen for the 
county to be ‘spared an execution’.89 In 1803 Carmarthen’s inhabitants were equally critical 
when the judge left a horse thief to hang, arguing that they did ‘not think the convict … 
judiciously selected as an object of public example’.90 Petitions sometimes argued that an 
execution would blot ‘the county’s reputation’ and on the periphery, where very few property 
offenders ever reached the gallows and mercy was the rule, it is clear that hangings often 
created a sense amongst the local community, both that their county’s reputation was on the 
line, and that the convict concerned was in a real sense the victim, thus putting the judges 
increasingly on the defensive.91  
There is also considerable evidence that county sheriffs, who were responsible for 
actually organising hangings and therefore experienced them much more directly, were 
especially prone to oppose the capital punishment system in areas on the periphery. In every 
county these officials were occasionally active in collecting signatures for pardon, but in both 
                                                          
88 Gatrell, The Hanging Tree, 422; TNA, HO 47/63/9. 
89 TNA, HO 47/64/14; Gatrell, The Hanging Tree, 422–3. 
90 TNA, HO 47/36/4. 
91 Gatrell, The Hanging Tree, 58. 
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Cornwall and Wales county sheriffs seem to have been particularly averse to executing 
property offenders. 92 ‘I cannot endure the thought of having a human being executed during 
the time I am in office’, the sheriff of Caernarvon wrote in relation to an offender left to hang 
for robbery.93 Some sheriffs went further and illegally delayed executions. In 1784, for 
example,  a Cornish undersheriff was threatened with prosecution for neglecting to execute a 
Truro housebreaker, leaving both the judge and Lord Falmouth quietly recommending to the 
Home Office that a conditional pardon would now be the best solution, even though ‘the man 
richly deserved hanging.’94  
Six years later the Home Office took an even dimmer view of the sheriff of 
Carmarthen’s decision to obstruct the execution of a horse thief specifically left to hang by 
the judge.95 Acting with the backing of the ‘first nobility, gentry and freeholders of 
Carmarthen,’ and having ‘a conviction … that he is by no means a fit object for example,’  
the sheriff chose to ignore the expiration of the initial respite, when the convict should 
automatically have been hanged.96 Aware that a change of ministry was imminent, he took 
matters into his own hands. ‘I have on my own authority’ he admitted, ‘respited him’ — his 
                                                          
92 TNA, HO 47/7/31, HO 47/53/20, HO 47/64/14. 
93 TNA, HO 47/63/9; Gatrell, The Hanging Tree, 422. 
94 TNA, HO 47/2/10. In 1798 once again a Cornish execution was delayed by the sheriff — a 
delay which the Home Office described as ‘an unwarrantable act’ that could lead to 
disciplinary measures. TNA, HO 47/22/34 
95 The following account is based on TNA, HO 47/36/4. 
96 The sheriff also wrote that he was determined that ‘nothing within my line of duty either as 
chief executive of the county or as a man of humanity’ would be ‘left un-attempted’ — TNA, 
HO 47/36/4. 
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excuse mainly being ‘a legal doubt … as to the power of a sheriff in executing a criminal 
after the day first appointed for his execution has elapsed.’ The Home Office clearly regarded 
him as ‘guilty of a high misdemeanour,’ and in ‘great contempt of justice’, and when the new 
Home Secretary also refused to pardon the convict he was eventually forced to hang the 
offender about a month after he should legally have done so.  
Radnorshire’s officials went a step further in 1814, conniving in the escape of an 
offender in gaol awaiting execution. Sarah Chandler had been convicted of forging bank 
notes and despite petitions from the county’s sheriff and magistrates, as well as from many 
ordinary citizens, judge Hardinge was adamant that she must be executed. Her case excited 
great sympathy, however. She had a baby still suckling, seven children under ten, and a cruel 
husband who refused to support them. Judge Hardinge, angered by ‘the obstinate and frantic 
zeal of the country for this wicked creature’s life,’ and the connivance of the magistrates with 
the ‘sagacity of the mob,’ stood firm, but this clash between the mood of the country and an 
obstinate judge was resolved when Sarah broke out of gaol and disappeared. The judge was 
clear who was responsible. ‘When she escaped the cell was not locked,’ he pointed out, 
because the sheriff had failed to provide locks and bolts. The ‘magistracy itself’ he 
concluded, was guilty of ‘culpable negligence if not connivance.’ She was under the ‘wing 
and shield of the country’ and her escape, he claimed, was no accident.97 The Home Office 
was not always powerless in such situations, but the difficulties they experienced in 
extracting sufficient information and their desire to keep such matters out of the public eye 
often forced them to compromise. Local elites in every part of the country involved 
                                                          
97 For another Welsh offender awaiting execution for sheep theft who escaped from gaol in 
1801 due in part to the neglect of the gaoler and lack of proper locks see D. Davies, Law and 
Discord in Breconshire 1750–1880 (Aberystwyth, no date), 58–9. 
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themselves deeply in the pardoning process, but at this stage of research it appears that it was 
only on the periphery that local officials were fairly regularly prepared to actually delay or 
directly connive against the execution of property offenders.98 
On the periphery this especially strong reluctance to hang property offenders extended 
right across the social scale. The petty jurors, whose decisions prevented a huge proportion of 
capital property offenders from being sentenced to hang, were drawn from the middling sort 
and often from the ranks of minor freeholders and farmers.99 They rarely recorded the reasons 
behind their decisions, but occasionally newspaper reports give some clues.100 One 
Caernarvon juror told a correspondent surprised by an acquittal that ‘neither my fellow 
jurymen nor myself had the least doubt of the prisoner’s guilt: but we were unwilling to bring 
in a verdict of guilty because we were aware the prisoner would have been punished with 
                                                          
98 Further research is needed but a fairly extensive search of pardoning cases not arising from 
the periphery has failed to find similar cases in which sheriffs deliberately subverted the 
system. 
99 Welsh jurors in particular were drawn from a lower social class than English ones: see 
Mark Ellis Jones, ‘“An Invidious Attempt to Accelerate the Extinction of our Language”: The 
Abolition of the Court of Great Sessions and the Welsh Language’ Welsh Historical Review, 
xix (1998), 250. On the occupation and wealth background of English jurors see Peter King, 
‘“Illiterate Plebeians, Easily Misled”: Jury Composition, Experience and Behaviour in Essex 
1735-1815’, and Douglas Hay, ‘The Class Composition of the Palladium of Liberty: Trial 
Jurors in the Eighteenth Century’ both in J. S. Cockburn and T. Green (eds.), Twelve Good 
Men and True: The Criminal Trial Jury in England 1200–1800 (Princeton, 1988). 
100 Jurors were not supposed to talk about their deliberations in public. 
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death, a penalty we conceived to be too severe for the offence’.101 The merciful Welsh jury 
was something of a stereotype. Arguing that ‘the Pembrokeshire personality’ had ‘a deep 
aversion to hanging,’ Audrey Philpin quotes the foreman of a local jury who when asked for 
the verdict announced: ‘not guilty, my Lord, but he must not do it again.’102 
Since the labouring poor rarely played any part in judicial decision-making, their 
attitudes are even more difficult to gauge but some sense of their antipathy towards the 
hanging of property offenders can be inferred from their unwillingness to take on the duty of 
hangman. Although it was rarely easy to find a hangman in any region, there is evidence that 
on the periphery this often proved practically impossible. In 1769 Flintshire’s sheriff in 
petitioning the Treasury concerning the costs of executing a local burglar wrote of his ‘great 
difficulty and expense ... in journeys to Liverpool and Shrewsbury to hire an executioner; the 
convict being a native of Wales it was impossible to procure any of that country to undertake 
the execution.’103 Similar problems were reported by the sheriffs of Cumberland and 
                                                          
101 Mary Aris, Julia Latham and Jo Pott (eds.), Crime and Punishment — a Welsh 
Perspective: Nineteenth-Century Crime and Protest (Gwynedd, 1987), 16–18. 
102 Audrey Philpin, ‘Crime and Protest 1815–1974’, in David W. Howell (ed.), 
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Walter Churchey; see also TNA, SP 44/87/237. 
103 The Cambrian, 21 Ap. 1821 recalling events 50 years earlier in which a Shropshire man 
hired to do the hanging absconded on the way to Flint and a fellow convict was eventually 
persuaded to do the task on receipt of twelve guineas. Half a century later this was still the 
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Westmorland. On two separate occasions the Cumberland sheriff was unable to recruit 
anyone to hang an offender and had to pay for someone to travel up from London, whilst in 
the 1790s the sheriff of Westmorland twice paid to bring an executioner in from Scotland.104 
Locals might also refuse to supply wood to make the gallows and in both Merionethshire and 
Anglesey local carpenters refused to erect a gallows, so that men had to be brought in from 
England.105 The direct impact of the labouring poor on capital punishment rituals could also 
be significant. Riots occasionally occurred in response to capital convictions for property 
crime that were perceived as likely to result in a hanging, and in Cornwall in the mid-
eighteenth century the Chief Justice was forced to abandon his plans to gibbet an offender, 
after being informed that ‘his friends would cut him down’ which would give the mob an 
opportunity for a ‘new triumph.’106  
A broad spectrum of social groups on the periphery therefore seem to have adhered to 
a very different set of cultural norms and imperatives in relation to the hanging of property 
offenders. All levels of society were involved from the ‘mob’ to the magistrates. If the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Wales to execute the office.’ However, the convict here had committed murder — The 
Cambrian, 28 Aug. 1830. 
104 In 1809–13: TNA, E 389/252–3 and T 90/169. One of these hangings cost the sheriff £31 
— a year’s wages for a labourer: TNA, T 90/167. 
105 Parry, Launched, 38 (a case in the 1870s) and Margaret Hughes, Crime and Punishment in 
Beaumaris (Llanrwst, 2006), 71–3. However, some of this evidence comes from outside the 
period focussed on here and involves the hanging of non-property offenders. 
106 Hay, ‘Property, Authority’, 50. For a northern example relating to two highway robbers in 
1790 see David Bentley, Capital Punishment in Northern England 1750–1900 (Sheffield, 
2008), 20.  
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Bloody Code was often a dead letter on the periphery it was primarily because the citizens of 
those areas chose to make it so. They remade justice from the margins in a unique and 
relatively merciful way.107 During the early nineteenth-century debates about the capital code 
those who advocated their repeal made virtually no reference to the patterns of execution 
avoidance we have traced on the periphery, but some of their general observations remain 
very appropriate as a description of what was happening there.108 ‘If the community is 
dissatisfied with the law’, Basil Montagu wrote, ‘the law’s strength is relaxed; the injured 
parties and public withhold their assistance; the ministers of justice endeavour by different 
expedients to defeat its operation.’109  
       
VI 
The much higher degree of communal dissatisfaction with the Bloody Code which lay behind 
its successful erosion on the periphery is easier to establish than to explain. Before briefly 
speculating about the broader social, religious and economic differences that may have 
played a role, two more easily-identifiable factors — the unique nature of the administration 
                                                          
107 For the ways justice was remade more generally at the local level see the introductory 
chapter on ‘Shaping and Remaking Justice from the Margins’ in Peter King, Crime and Law 
in England 1750–1840: Remaking Justice from the Margins (Cambridge, 2006), 1–72. 
108 Although witnesses before the 1819 Select Committee on the Criminal Laws were almost 
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109 Basil Montagu, ‘Some Inquiries Respecting the Punishment of Death for Crimes without 
Violence’ Pamphleteer, xii (1818), 295. 
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of justice in Wales, and the impact of linguistic differences — require discussion. Two 
aspects of the administration of the Welsh Great Sessions probably made it easier for the 
local population to influence the judges. First, the Welsh judges themselves were much lesser 
figures than their equivalents in England. English judges were full-time and when not on 
circuit they sat in the prestigious Westminster courts. Welsh judges were part-timers. They 
had an ‘amphibious professional existence … being judges for six weeks and practising or 
retired barristers’ for the rest of the year.110 They were appointed by ministerial patronage 
rather than by the Lord Chancellor and had often obtained their posts because they were MPs 
or had parliamentary influence.111 Judge Hardinge, for example, was MP for the rotten 
borough of Old Sarum.112 Most of the Welsh judges therefore lacked both the natural 
authority, and social distance from those approaching them for pardons, that the English 
judges enjoyed.113 Secondly, unlike the English judges who frequently changed circuits, the 
                                                          
110 Parl. Papers, ‘Report into the Practice and Proceedings of the Courts of Common Law’, 
ix (46), (1829), 454. 
111 Parl. Papers, ‘Practice and Proceedings of the Courts of Common Law’, ix (46), (1829), 
453; Parl. Papers, ‘Report of the Select Committee on the Administration of Justice in 
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Welsh judges were appointed to one circuit only and therefore went back to the same few 
counties each year. Some served their circuit for many decades: judge Moysey for instance 
had already served forty years by 1817.114 Their appointments were for life and they therefore 
developed long-term relationships with key local figures, from some of whom they might 
receive considerable patronage.115 As a result, to quote the 1817 parliamentary report on the 
administration of justice in Wales, ‘by coming often amongst them’ the judges were able to 
become ‘more perfectly conversant with the manners and feelings of the Welsh.’116 Amongst 
the local knowledge they would have accumulated would have been an acute sense of the 
aversion the Welsh had for the hanging of property offenders, which may in part explain the 
very high pardoning rates found in Wales. 
The potential impact of linguistic differences was also particularly great in Wales, 
though it may well have played an equally important role elsewhere on the periphery. In 
Wales the majority of the population were Welsh-speaking but the proceedings of the Great 
Sessions were primarily held in English, a language which many of those attending court as 
prosecutors, witnesses and jurors did not speak or fully understand.117 Since few of the judges 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Common Law’, ix (46), (1829), 454. Before 1773 the Welsh judges could also appoint 
deputies — see Parl. Papers, ‘Administration of Justice in Wales’, v (461), (1817), 9. 
114 Parl. Papers, ‘Administration of Justice in Wales’, v (461), (1817), 14, 68; ‘Practice and 
Proceedings of the Courts of Common Law’, ix (46), (1829), 419. 
115 Parl. Papers, ‘Administration of Justice in Wales’, v (461), (1817), 14, for a Welsh judge 
holding another lucrative local office under Lord Cholmondley. 
116 Parl. Papers, ‘Administration of Justice in Wales’, v (461), (1817), 42.  
117 As late as the 1891 census 54 per cent spoke Welsh: P. O’Leary, ‘Accommodation and 
Resistance: A Comparison of Cultural Identities in Ireland and Wales 1880–1914’, in 
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appointed to the Great Sessions were Welsh-speaking, and since even those amongst the 
Welsh-speaking witnesses who could also speak English often refused to do so, the court was 
plagued by language problems.118 As Jenkins has pointed out, ‘many monoglot Welshmen 
who served on juries were unable to make much sense of the proceedings … and were 
therefore prone to favour and protect their neighbours,’ and this link between the relative 
leniency of Welsh jurors and the fact that the hearings were not conducted in their native 
language was also made by some Great Sessions judges.119 However, the systematic refusal 
of Welsh jurors to fully capitally convict those accused of serious property offences such as 
robbery and burglary was not just a function of their inability to understand the evidence. The 
language issue, Minkes has argued, would also have emphasised a more important point — 
the generally alien nature of the legal system itself.120  
The same would have almost certainly have been true in the north-west Highlands of 
Scotland where Gaelic-speakers remained very widespread, and to a lesser extent in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Connolly (ed.), Kingdoms United?, 124. Witnesses giving evidence in Welsh were examined 
by means of an interpreter: William Russell Oldnall, The Practice of the Court of Great 
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118 Howard, ‘Investigating’, 414; Williams, ‘The History of the Great Sessions’, 19, suggests 
that less than 15 per cent were born in Wales and not all of these would have been native 
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Cornwall, even though Cornish-speaking was dying out by the end of the eighteenth 
century.121 The extremely close geographical correlation between the peripheral areas with 
very low eighteenth-century execution rates and the parts of Britain that still maintained 
separate Celtic language traditions is striking.122 They were often coterminous. Devon, with 
no such tradition, did not have low rates. Cornwall did. Moreover two of the three counties in 
Wales with less radically-low execution rates were among the few areas where Welsh 
speaking was also less prevalent.123 Unfortunately very limited evidence has survived for 
eighteenth-century Ireland — the other major Celtic region that could be used for 
comparison. However, S. J. Connolly’s work on the low numbers executed in Ireland before 
the 1790s and on the incredibly high acquittal rates found in areas like Cork, suggests 
significant parallels. Here too execution rates were up to twenty times lower in Cork than in 
Dublin, and counties such as Fermanagh proudly claimed to have no executions for more 
than two decades, leading Connolly to conclude that ‘the frequent use of the gallows was 
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very much a feature of English society rather than of any of the three Celtic Dominions.’124 It 
would be easy, given these parallel geographies, to simply assert that the Celtic lands were by 
nature averse to capital punishment in cases not involving violence, but this is far too 
simplistic. While it is true that in such areas, and particularly in Wales, legal traditions tended 
to emphasise restorative rather than punitive justice in property crime cases, many other 
forces were at work.125   
In England and Wales, the core area studied here, several broader social and 
economic factors also correlate well with very low execution rates. The areas with extremely 
low rates were predominantly upland pastoral regions. The high hanging rate areas of the 
South and East of England were dominated by lowland arable agriculture or mixed 
farming.126 While the simple juxtaposition of two commonly used sets of conjunctions — 
upland/pastoral/disorderly and lowland/arable/deferential — is clearly far too simplistic, 
these configurations may well have influenced approaches to capital punishment. The precise 
vectors through which this occurred are difficult to unravel and cannot be investigated here, 
but different levels of social inequality may well have been one link. As Leigh Shaw Taylor’s 
recent work has shown, mapping the ratio of male farm workers to farmers (a rough proxy for 
levels of rural social inequality) produces a not dissimilar pattern to the execution rates found 
in Map 1, the ratios being lowest in western and northern England and highest in the South-
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East.127 Moreover, as Sharon Howard has pointed out, ratios of labourers to farmers in most 
of Wales were also very much lower than in arable England, where communities were more 
likely to be divided between small groups of well-off farmers and many landless labourers for 
whom, as Crabbe succinctly put it ‘the wealth around them makes them doubly poor.’128 
Commentators frequently remarked on the relative absence of inequality on the periphery. As 
a witness before the 1826 ‘Committee on Criminal Commitments’ pointed out, ‘in 
Cumberland both the farmers and the agricultural labourers are content with mean and scanty 
food.’ The farmers’ standards of living excited ‘no envy or discontent’ amongst the labourers 
‘because in point of fact it is very little better or more luxurious.’129 A few years later a 
commentator on policing in the rural districts of the northern counties stressed the high levels 
of ‘mutual dependence and attachment’ in such areas and pointed out that,  
 
in the thinly populated and mountainous tracts, the soil is parcelled out amongst 
petty proprietors between whom and their agricultural dependants there is small 
distinction … Each village forms a little community approaching more nearly to a 
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state of perfect equality than can readily be conceived by those who have formed 
their opinions … from observations made in the more southern counties.130  
 
Did relatively low levels of social inequality mean that pastoral communities on the periphery 
were less willing to prosecute in the major courts? The survival and growth of many informal 
sanctioning systems in Wales in this period certainly suggests this is a possibility. Moreover, 
if Douglas Hay is correct in suggesting that ‘the violence of the law, measured by 
prosecutions and punishments, was largely determined by the need to contain the effects, 
direct and indirect, of substantial social inequality’ then both propensities to prosecute and 
willingness to hang may well have been lower in areas like Wales, Cumberland and Cornwall 
than they were in the South and East, because levels of inequality were also much smaller.131  
Detailed research on individual counties and areas is needed before we can unravel 
the deeper forces that lay behind the very low execution rates for property crime found on the 
eighteenth-century periphery. However, beneath the higher pardoning rates and the many 
levels of mitigating jury verdicts (and merciful victims’ decisions) that were the immediate 
causes, a group of inter-related but less easily quantified factors clearly shaped the mentalities 
that undermined the power of the Bloody Code throughout the periphery. 
 
      VII 
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This new research raises several broader issues which can only be briefly discussed here. For 
example, if the geography of hangings was so uneven and if property offenders were virtually 
never executed in many areas on the periphery, this raises interesting questions about the role 
criminal justice historians have given to the Bloody Code in maintaining the hegemony of the 
eighteenth-century elite — a role that is also advanced as one of the main reasons why they 
wanted to leave the code unrepealed.132 After describing the capital statutes as ‘the legal 
instruments which enforced the division of property by terror,’ Douglas Hay later points out 
that ‘the idea of justice was always dangerous … it was easy to claim equal justice for 
murderers of all classes, where a universal moral sanction was likely to be found … The trick 
was to extend the communal sanction to a criminal law that was nine-tenths concerned with 
upholding a radical division of property.’133 In relation to capital punishment at least, it is 
difficult not to conclude, in the light of the evidence produced here, that for much of the 
eighteenth century the elite almost completely failed to pull off this trick in most of Wales, 
Scotland and the western periphery of England.  
In this context, moreover, Gatrell’s statement that ‘the sanction of the gallows and the 
rhetoric of the death sentence were central to all relations of authority in Georgian England’ 
also seems problematic.134 It might be argued, of course, that the rhetoric alone was largely 
sufficient and that very few actual hangings were necessary in order to achieve this effect, but 
the complete absence of hangings for property crime across long periods in many counties in 
western Wales, Highland Scotland and the far West and North-West of England, which were 
by no means especially orderly places, suggests that in significant parts of Britain the penal 
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system functioned equally effectively in its key everyday function — the protection of 
property — without the use of the death penalty. This is not to say that capital punishment 
was not vitally important to the governing elite when they faced extreme threats to the social 
and political order, such as the Gordon riots, the extensive food riots of 1800–1, or the 
Jacobite rebellions. Moreover, as Hay has shown, the gallows could also be used strategically 
in the middle of a period of rioting to deter further disturbances by threatening to hang those 
already arrested if their fellow rioters did not desist.135 In such extreme contexts the 
widespread use of the gallows and even the threat of it were a vital part of the armoury of the 
elite. However, the everyday use of the Bloody Code to bolster the hegemony of the ruling 
elite by schooling the people in ‘the lessons of Justice, Mercy and Terror’ must surely have 
been constrained by the fact that in certain parts of the periphery mercy was almost 
universally the rule.136 Perhaps in areas like Wales and Cornwall the elite were able to 
reinforce their reputations as the natural leaders of the community by using their roles as 
sheriffs, magistrates, MPs etc. to engage deeply and effectively in the various processes that 
prevented property offenders from being hung. However, the potential created by their 
private access to ‘the levers of fear and mercy,’ would have been very seriously constrained if 
local opinion almost always prevented them from using the former.137 If significant parts of 
eighteenth-century Britain successfully avoided using the terror of the gallows against 
property offenders for long periods, the role of capital punishment in English, Scottish and 
Welsh social relations may have been less central than we have assumed. Even if we accept 
that the reinforcement of hegemony involved using a changing combination of terror and 
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mercy at different times and places, we are still left with the question of how, for extended 
periods, the elite maintained their authority in large areas of Britain through the use of mercy 
alone. 
Historian’s accounts of the nature and timing of the growth of opposition to the 
capital statutes may also need considerable modification. A deep reluctance to use the Bloody 
Code was already well in place on the periphery before Beccaria’s Crimes and Punishments 
was published, and before influential utilitarian and evangelical advocates of reform such as 
Bentham and Buxton were even born.138 There were clearly more strands to the process of 
opinion-formation in relation to capital punishment than most historians have recognised. If 
the notion that the hanging of property offenders was wrong and should be avoided first 
became dominant in precisely those areas, such as the far western and northern uplands of 
Britain, where literacy was lowest and where urbanisation and more deeply market-orientated 
relationships had yet to gather much momentum, the relatively straightforward relationship 
many have posited between the emergence of opposition to the capital code and various 
aspects of the journey to modernity, such as the influence of the Enlightenment, will need to 
be considerably modified. Gatrell’s emphasis on the ‘sudden revolution’ represented by the 
‘dramatic’ and rapid ‘retreat from hanging in the 1830s’ may also need revisiting.139 If, as he 
suggests, ‘it was not obvious to most people before the 1830s that capital punishment for 
                                                          
138 And before Blackstone’s brief but influential passage in his Commentaries, on which see 
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relatively trivial crimes was an inhumane way of dealing with crime,’ how can we explain the 
strong tradition of large-scale reluctance to execute property offenders that had already been 
in place for nearly a century on the periphery?140 
Finally, the research presented here also offers new insights into the nature and reach 
of the central state in the eighteenth century. For example, by showing that one of the most 
important weapons in the state’s social policy armoury was used much more intensively in 
England than it was in Scotland, in Wales or (most probably) in Ireland, this study has added 
further weight to Joanna Innes’s suggestion that the tendency of eighteenth-century historians 
to focus on English governance has created a false impression of the unity of the British 
state.141 In eighteenth-century Scotland, outside periods of acute political crisis, the use of the 
capital code against property offenders was minimal compared to its widespread use in 
England. This was partly because Scotland, which had a different legal system, had largely 
resisted importing new capital offences from England.142 However, since Wales had the same 
legal code as England, the fact that Welsh policies towards the hanging of property offenders 
were also much more merciful than those found in England suggests that differences in 
statute law were not necessarily the key factor, although administrative differences such as 
the lower status of the Welsh judges may have played a role. It has been argued that the case 
for distinguishing Welsh from English policies is much weaker than that for distinguishing 
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Scottish from English, but in relation to the Bloody Code this does not seem to have been the 
case.143 Although Scotland had a different legal system to that of England and Wales, the 
actual policies it pursued in relation to capital punishment had much in common with the 
latter and very little with the former.  
Since an extreme reluctance to activate the Bloody Code also dominated criminal 
justice policy on the western periphery of England, it seems, however, that these variations 
between Scotland, England and Wales may have been less important than a much more 
general factor — overall distance from the centre. The fact that almost every area on the far 
western and northern periphery largely avoided using the Bloody Code for long periods in the 
second half of the eighteenth century and the early decades of the nineteenth century suggests 
that, as James C. Scott has argued, the sheer distance of regions from the centre and the 
parallel erosion of central power in the western uplands caused by ‘the friction of terrain’ set 
severe limitations on the cultural and political influence of the British state.144 Research on 
other areas of social and fiscal policy suggests that this pattern was not confined to the capital 
code. From the beginning of the Old Poor Law to the early days of the New, the state 
experienced many problems in implementing poor law policy in parts of the periphery. For 
example, while formal rate-financed poor relief was in operation in most parts of England by 
the mid-seventeenth century, much of Wales did not levy poor rates until the early eighteenth, 
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and some parts were still not doing so in 1780.145 This pattern continued through to the New 
Poor Law era. The deep resistance of the Welsh to the workhouse principle was also echoed 
in the South-West — these regions being the main areas where out-relief absolutely 
dominated poor law provision, and when the central Poor Law Commissioners were forced to 
make policy exceptions it was primarily the same regions that benefited.146 The poor law 
unions excluded from the General Order of 1845, for example, came almost exclusively from 
the North-West, the North-East, Wales and Cornwall — such exceptions, as Keith Snell has 
pointed out, being particularly ‘revealing of local opposition to central policy.’147 In the area 
of prison building similar patterns can be found. By the 1630s almost every area of England 
had implemented the legislation requiring the building of county houses of correction, but the 
central state had to wait another century before most of Wales came into line.148 Taxation 
policies could be equally difficult to enforce on the western periphery. Eighteenth-century 
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Land Tax burdens were lightest in the North, Wales and to a lesser extent in the South-West 
and heaviest in the South and East, which carried burdens six or more times greater than 
those of Cumbria and western Wales.149 The avoidance of customs and excise duty, while 
widespread everywhere, was also particularly prevalent in areas like Cornwall where the 
jurors simply refused to convict. In 1768, for example, the trial of four smugglers indicted for 
the murder of a Penzance excise officer was reported as follows: ‘the trial lasted upwards of 
eleven hours when the facts were fully and clearly proved … notwithstanding which the jury 
(contrary to the opinion of the whole court) found them not guilty.’ This pattern was not 
exceptional. A decade later the Cornish magistrate Edward Giddy admitted it was useless to 
bring Revenue cases to court because ‘a Cornish jury would certainly acquit the 
smugglers.’150 
Thus it was not only in relation to the use of capital punishment for property offenders 
that attitudes on the periphery were completely different. In other key areas of policy, such as 
the raising of taxes or the building of institutions like prisons and workhouses, the eighteenth- 
and early nineteenth-century state, based as it was on a multi-centred institutional framework 
that was less regulatory than it had been in the seventeenth century, often found it difficult to 
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fully impose its policies on the periphery.151 By looking at a central aspect of the state’s 
power, its monopoly of judicial violence (and in particular its use of the key coercive force of 
the gallows), this study has added new weight to a growing body of research which suggests 
that Scott’s ideas about the relative autonomy experienced by regions on the periphery have 
important implications for our understanding of the limitations of the central state in 
eighteenth-century Britain.152 The deep reluctance of the far western and northern peripheries 
of Britain to implement the Bloody Code to any significant degree may therefore require us 
to rethink not only some of our core assumptions about the foundations of the elite’s 
hegemony and our narrative about changing attitudes to the abolition of capital punishment, 
but also our understanding of the geographical limitations of the reach of the fiscal-military 
state in the long eighteenth century. 
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Map 1. County Execution Rates for all Property Offences, England and Wales, 1750–75 
(Execution rates are per 100,000 population per annum) 
 
Table 1. Execution Rates for Property Offences in England (1755–75), Wales (1755–75) and Scotland (1755–70) 
(Execution rates are per 100,000 population per annum) 
 
Country 
Executions - Property 
Offences 
Population 
Estimate Years of Data 
Execution Rate - 
Property Offences 
England 1,056 6,211,289 21 0.81 
Wales 16 477,105 21 0.16 
Scotland 20 1,317,582 16 0.09 
Total 1,092 8,005,976 19 0.72 
 
NB. Population estimate for England and Wales is based on the year 1765, and for Scotland it is based on the year 1762. 
Cheshire and Monmouthshire are included within England. 
 
Figure 1. Execution Rates for Property Offences in Middlesex, Home Circuit, Norfolk Circuit and Western Peripheries, 1750–1819  
(Execution rates are per 100,000 population and 5 year moving averages). 
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Figure 2. Execution Rates for Property Offences in Cornwall and the Brecon Circuit, 1750–1819  
(Execution rates are per 100,000 population and 5 year moving averages) 
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Table 2a. Robbery — Grand and Petty Jury Verdicts, 1750–75 
Grand jury verdicts   
Not found Found Total 
% Not 
Found 
Wales 31 16 47 66% 
Essex 13 103 116 11% 
Petty jury verdicts  
Not Guilty 
Partial 
Verdict Full Guilty Total % NG % PV % FG 
Wales 11 0 5 16 69% 0% 31% 
Essex 35 1 67 103 34% 1% 65% 
Combined Grand and 
Petty jury  
Full Guilty Total % FG 
Wales 5 47 11% 
Essex 67 116 58% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2b. Petty Jury Verdicts — Burglary, Housebreaking and Theft from Dwelling House combined, 1750–75 
 
Region Not Guilty 
Partial 
Verdict Full Guilty Total % NG % PV % FG 
Wales 60 52 41 153 39% 34% 27% 
Cornwall 23 54 19 96 24% 56% 20% 
Essex 47 91 96 234 20% 39% 41% 
London 622 655 789 2066 30% 32% 38% 
Total 704 758 849 2311 30% 33% 37% 
Table 3. Percentage Pardoned by Category of Offence for Selected English and Welsh Counties, 1760–75 
Middlesex 
Met Low Pard Rate 
Counties 
Rural Low Pard Rate 
Counties 
Periphery High Pard 
Rate Counties 
Offence Category 
Capital 
Convictions 
% 
Pardoned 
Capital 
Convictions 
% 
Pardoned 
Capital 
Convictions 
% 
Pardoned 
Capital 
Convictions 
% 
Pardoned 
All Offs 786 52.0% 663 72.9% 555 80.0% 174 94.8% 
Robbery 280 51.8% 238 58.4% 111 52.3% 14 64.3% 
Burglary 218 46.3% 119 63.9% 101 78.2% 16 87.5% 
House Breaking 8 62.5% 35 82.9% 55 81.8% 8 100.0% 
Horse Stealing 33 78.8% 121 91.7% 105 90.5% 48 97.9% 
Cattle Stealing 18 100.0% 67 98.5% 102 97.1% 65 98.5% 
Stealing Specified Place 114 58.8% 36 88.9% 47 85.1% 9 100.0% 
Shoplifting 22 77.3% 5 100.0% 0 - 1 100.0% 
Pickpocketing 12 100.0% 7 100.0% 6 100.0% 3 66.7% 
Misc Theft 0 - 5 100.0% 12 100.0% 5 80.0% 
Forgery 51 21.6% 4 0.0% 7 57.1% 3 100.0% 
Fraud 20 25.0% 8 37.5% 1 100.0% 0 - 
Coining 10 20.0% 6 50.0% 0 - 1 100.0% 
Arson 0 - 6 50.0% 8 62.5% 1 100.0% 
Damage to Property 0 - 6 66.7% 0 - 0 - 
 
Middlesex: City of London and Middlesex 
Metropolitan Low Pardoning Rate Counties: Berkshire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Kent, Surrey 
Rural Low Pardoning Rate Counties: Devon, Gloucestershire, Hampshire, Suffolk, Wiltshire 
Periphery High Pardoning Rate Counties: Anglesey, Breconshire, Caernarvonshire, Cornwall, Cumberland, Denbighshire, Glamorganshire, 
Merionethshire, Monmouthshire, Montgomeryshire, Northumberland, Pembrokeshire, Radnorshire, Westmorland 
  
